Introduction
Globalization is not a new phenomenon, in that the processes of investment internationalisation has been taking place over several centuries (Steger 2003) . However, the dates at which the processes of globalisation began is debateable, and there are various possible departure points which we may point to as being critical junctures in this longstanding process (McCann 2008) . Early developments along the road to globalisation include: the invention of double-entry book-keeping and the banking systems which emerged in the fifteenth century Italian city-states of Florence, Venice and Sienna; the invention of the joint-stock company in The Netherlands in the early fifteenth century: the growth of underwriting and insurance markets in the seventeenth century financial markets London; the advent of industrialisation in eighteenth century Britain, and the subsequent industrialisation of other parts of the world. As we will see in this paper, each of these particular technological or institutional developments has been associated with increasing urbanisation, and the links between trade, growth and urbanisation at various stages in history have also both challenged, and in many ways also, defined the notion of a state, and therefore the concept of what it is to be a country.
The most recent phase of globalisation since the late 1970s and early 1980s has been characterised by enormous improvements in both transportations and communications technologies, dramatic increases in the openness of international capital and labour markets (Venables 2006) , and the development of areas of international economic integration in which many nation-specific institutional structures are to differing degrees harmonised and merged between countries (McCann 2008 (McCann , 2009 ). Yet, while many of these globalising developments can appear to be radically new, it is also possible to see them as part of a longterm trend, which was interrupted by much of the twentieth century, simply because much of the twentieth century was actually characterised by long periods of anti-globalization. The ratio of world trade to global GDP fell during the period , while the ratio of foreign assets to global GDP declined from 1914 onwards, and was not attained again until 1980 (Crafts 2004), and the period since then has been characterised by the re-globalisation of trade and international investment (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007) . Even more recently, since 1990, the opening up of the transition economies has brought some 260 million new workers, China some 760 million new workers, and India another 440 million new workers, into the global labour market (Venables 2006) . As such, the major difference between the current phase of globalization and previous phases, may primarily be in terms of the order of magnitude rather than in terms of its nature (Crafts 2004; MacGillivray 2006 ). Yet there are also aspects in which it may be rather different. Whereas for many centuries European countries had relatively very little mutual trade and investment, today's bilateral trade and bilateral investment stocks between groups of countries such as the US, Canada and EU (Krugman 2007) or between Japan and the other East Asian economies (UNCTAD 2007) , are much greater than what would be predicted simply on the basis of the scale of the two economies. In a globalising world, economic geography, and in particular proximity for certain types of activities, appears to be becoming ever more important (McCann 2008) . This paper will argue that the most recent phase of globalisation is once again increasingly challenging the notion of a country by redefining the relationship between cities, trade and growth. In future decades, these challenges will increasingly be mediated by multinational firms located in highly-connected cities inside areas of integration. These arguments are developed by adopting an economic history approach to the study of economic geography, in which we tease out the long-term changes in the relationship between countries, cities, and globalisation. The paper will not discuss the insights of theoretical models relating economic geography to globalisation as these are well-rehearsed elsewhere (Fujita 2007; McCann 2008) . Rather, we focus here simply on the observed historical outcomes of such processes right up to the present.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we discuss recent analyses regarding the logic and organisation of a country. It will become apparent that the major missing elements in these arguments are the issues of agglomeration economies and economic geography. Therefore, in section 3 we discuss the long term relationships between growth, trade and urbanisation, tracing these developments from the Middle Ages right up to the twenty-first century, and demonstrating that historically these three phenomena are inextricably linked. In section 4 we examine the role played by multinational firms in the current phase of globalisation, and discuss how their location behaviour relates to areas of economic integration. Our conclusion is that the future role and definition of a country will increasingly be mediated by the future interactions between multinational firms, global cities, and areas of economic integration.
Countries and Nation States
The four centuries spanning the sixteenth to the nineteenth century represents the period in which almost all parts of the world came to dominated to some degree by the emergence of large European powers such as France, Netherlands, Spain, Austria-Hungary, Britain and Russia (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007; Maddison 2007) . The modern notion of sovereignty which governed the international relations between these powers is usually attributed to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, whereby the state was viewed as exercising comprehensive (over all issues), supreme (no superior authority), unqualified (by any other state), and exclusive (no joint sovereignty) control (Easton 2007 ). Yet, these principles were established at a time when there was little interaction between states, whose economic relations were primarily contained within their colonial systems (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007) . This is in marked contrast to the modern nation state, which is a relatively recent concept, and primarily a result of the nineteenth century. That this is so can be seen from the fact that only about ten of today's 190 or so nation states existed largely in the form they do now at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and only twenty or so existed largely in their current form even in the mid-nineteenth century (Easton 2007).
In orthodox trade theory and international business theory, economists generally assume that the size of the country is exogenous, being determined by history. While much research focuses on the role played by institutions and trade barriers in promoting growth (World Bank 2003 , 2008a , it is generally assumed that the size, and border geography of a country is given, at least in the short to medium term. Yet, the observations above suggest that over medium to long term, the number and size of countries is itself variable. While the formation and fragmentation of states is central to the work of many historians and political scientists, outside of economic history such issues have tended to tend to play almost no role in modern economics, until very recently. Much of the interest in these issues has been spawned by the processes of globalisation, because such processes ask fundamental questions about the nature and role of the nation state.
According to Alesina and Spolaore (2005) , the size of country depends on a trade-off between the benefits of size versus the costs of heterogeneity. On the one hand, the benefits of being a large country relate to the efficiency gains in the provision of public goods, such as monetary and fiscal institutions, police, defence, health, embassies, national parks, transport infrastructure, the taxation system bureaucracy, all of which may be associated with economies of scale. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that the relative size of government spending is inversely related to the size of the country. At the same time, larger countries also imply larger economies, and thus larger size economies should be more productive, and this 'home market effect' has been observed in many cases (Fujita et al. 1999) . National size also helps with interregional fiscal transfers, both of a temporary insurance nature or of a more systematic income distributional nature, since independent states cannot be partially stabilised by other countries.
These scale benefits associated with large countries are in contrast with the benefits of being a small country, which arise primarily in an environment of preference heterogeneity. Such preference heterogeneity arises out of local variations in culture, language, ethnicity, and historical experience (Alesina and Spolaore 2005) . In a context of heterogeneous preferences, the centralised provision of public goods would exhibit congestion costs and diseconomies of scale. From a welfare perspective, the optimum size of a country is the size which maximises the average level of citizen welfare, by providing the optimal bundle of public goods which takes account of the trade-off between economies of scale in public good provision and preferences heterogeneity, subject to certain constraints. One of these constraints is the fact that in these welfare maximisation terms, the optimal size of the state will generally different for every good, service or policy. As such, this would lead to an overlapping maze of borders, which would be inefficient in the presence of economies of scope or scale. Broadly, therefore, because of these jurisdictional problems, higher economies of scale or scope tend to imply fewer centralized jurisdictions (Alesina and Spolaore 2005).
The arguments of Alesina and Spolaore (2005) lead to several direct and testable conclusions. Firstly, the importance of the effect of country size also depends on the level of the country's openness to the global economy. This is because the relationship between size of a country and the size of its market depends on the degree of openness to international markets. Under complete autarky, the size of a country and the size of its market are the same thing, while in a world of complete international openness they are entirely independent of each other. In the more typical case where countries are neither perfectly closer nor perfectly open to oneanother, the more open is a country, the larger will be its market size. Assuming preference heterogeneity, then these arguments also imply that the more open is a country, the smaller will be the country's optimum size, and much evidence supports this (World Bank 2007) . This relationship should also be accelerated as trade barriers fall and global economic integration increases, and the number of small countries should increase as these are the very countries which have relatively the most to gain from free trade. Secondly, the arguments of Alesina and Spolaore (2005) also suggest that dictatorships will prefer larger countries in order to extract more taxation rents from their populations. Democratisation should therefore produce many smaller countries, each of which is more internally homogenous. The evidence which Alesina and Spolaore (2005) point to in support of their arguments regarding preference heterogeneity favouring small countries comes from the fact that whereas in 1945 there were 74 independent countries, following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the European colonial systems, and the rapidly increasing process of globalisation, by 2005 there were 193 countries (Alesina and Spolaore 2005). As of 1995, 87 countries had less than million people, 58 had less than 2.5 million, and 35 countries had less than 500,000 inhabitants. By 2005, more than half of the world's countries had less than 6 million inhabitants.
Thirdly, the arguments of Alesina and Spolaore (2005) also predict that the greater regional variation in preferences, and also regional variations in income within a country, the greater will be the pressure for fragmentation. On one hand, in terms of the preference heterogeneity of the geographical periphery, this pressure comes from the sense of political, cultural and economic isolation and a perceived lack of influence and marginalisation in national affairs. At the same time, where significant interregional fiscal transfers operate from wealthy to poorer regions, pressure for fragmentation of the state can also come from the economic centre. In addition, in an environment where the economic centre has little appetite for the fragmentation of the state, such secession activity can also be viewed as a rational strategy for extracting rents and transferring these from the centre to the periphery, as with the case of Spain and the UK. Evidence in favour of national fragmentation pressure emanating from the economic periphery comes from observations of Scottish, Catalan, Basque, Quebec, and Slovak nationalism, while national fragmentation pressure emanating from the economic centre comes from observations of Northern Italy, Belgium and the Czech Republic.
However, there are also other observations which cast doubt on the arguments and empirical observations raised by Alesnia and Spolaore (2005) . Alesina and Spolaore's arguments are really asking questions about institutions, and in particular, institutions concerning governance and trade. Yet, recent work increasingly suggests that there are no simple ideal institutional typologies for developing countries (Rodrik 2007) , and the logic of institutional arrangements including border arrangements themselves will also depend heavily on both the economic and political geography (Collier 2006) . In terms of scale, fifty-eight of the countries which comprise the bottom billion of the global population are small. These fiftyeight countries have a combined income of less than that of India and most are actually declining in wealth in both absolute as well as relative terms (Collier 2006) . Moreover, these are the very countries who are most vulnerable in the current phase of globalisation and increasing openness, precisely because of a lack of economies of scale, agglomeration and geographical accessibility (Collier 2006) . This however, is not a new reality. Modern notions of nationalism and the large nation-state mainly arose after, and partly in response to the nineteenth century trends in globalisation. For example, the micro-state model of the German confederation of 35 monarchies and four free cities 1815-1866 became obsolete by the mid 19 century, primarily due to the falling costs of distance and increasing regional trade (Easton 2007) . The Alesina and Spolaore arguments in favour of smallness in an integrating world therefore appear rather problematic, and it may be the case that their arguments relate primarily only to the rich countries. However, at this stage something still appears to be missing, in that we need to ask -how do countries become rich, and how do the interregional variations in income which drive Alesina and Spolaore's hypotheses arise in the first place? On this point, the arguments of Krugman (1991 ), Fujita et al. (1999 ), Collier (2006 , Venables (2006) and Fujita (2007 Fujita ( , 2008 , and all point of the critical role of both agglomeration economies and geographical proximity and accessibility in enhancing national growth. If we allow for the fact that the cartography of borders may change as the role and In the sixteenth century the urbanization processes in Italy stalled, and it would appear that this was related to the fact that during this period the Italian states did not benefit from the expanding trade and resource-acquisition opportunities afforded by colonial expansion. That this is the case can be seen from the fact that during the sixteenth century there were three European states which undertook significant colonial expansions, namely Spain, Portugal and the Dutch Republic. These are also the three countries which exhibited the most notable increases in urbanisation during the sixteenth century. Major cities emerged as the commercial centres of these expanding colonial systems during the sixteenth century. Amsterdam was the hub of the expanding Dutch empire, while Lisbon emerged as the hub of Portuguese colonial expansions. In terms of Spanish territory, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, while Paris remained Western Europe's largest city with 245,000 inhabitants, it was now closely rivalled by Naples with 224,000 inhabitants (Chandler 1987). More noticeably, in 1600, along with Seville, Milan and Palermo, the kingdom of Spain now also contained five of the ten western European cities with over 100,000 inhabitants, the others being London, Lisbon, Venice, Prague and Rome (Chandler 1987) . However, by 1700, the century-long rise of the Dutch Republic and the growth of Dutch Trade had resulted in Amsterdam emerging as the third largest western European city, after London and Paris (Table 2) , and the Low Countries as the most densely urbanised regions of western Europe (Table 1) . By 1700, these three cities were the home locations of the East India and West India companies of England, Netherlands and France (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007). These were the first joint stock-issuing multinational corporations and spearheaded the internationalisation processes of the major European nations.
Table 2 The World's Largest Cities in 1700
In Table 2 we see that the largest fifteen cities in the world in 1700 ranged in population from Constantinople (Istanbul) at 700,000 to Lisbon at 188,000. Nine of the world's fifteen largest cities were in Asia, with five being located in western Europe, as well as Constantinople at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. The two largest cities of western Europe, namely London and Paris, were almost identical in size. However, Table 2 also demonstrates that the major cities of Europe in 1700 were largely of the same order of magnitude as the largest cities in other parts of the world. This may appear surprising given that the populations and economies of China and India were far larger than for any other countries. Yet, clues as to why the European and Asian cities were of the same order of magnitude comes from the fact that the national per capita GDP of the dominant European cities' own countries, was already of the order of two to four times that of the major Asian economies. In 1700, productivity in The Netherlands was almost twice that of any other country. This suggests that while the size of a major city appears to be partly related to size of the country in which it is located, the city size also appears to be related the productivity of the country in which it is located.
Table 3 The World's Largest Cities in 1800
The eighteenth century was the era during which Great Britain had undergone the first phase of the industrial revolution, particularly after 1750, with rapid industrialisation, capitalisation and urban-rural migration. As we see in Table 1 , by 1800, Britain was the most industrialised country in the world. Meanwhile, the extent of urbanisation in England, Wales and Scotland had also grown to a much greater degree than any European country apart from the Low Countries of The Netherlands and Belgium, and to a far greater extent than France. The result of this was that by 1800 London had become the second largest city in the world, and some 57% larger than western Europe's second largest city, Paris. As we see in Table 3 , by 1800, six of the world's largest fifteen cities were now located in western Europe, although the list of European cities in the global city rankings had changed somewhat. Most notably, Moscow and Vienna were by then both members of the world's largest fifteen cities. The growth of these cities during the eighteenth century coincided with the growth of Russian Empire under Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, and the growth of the Habsburg Monarchy, respectively.
Table 4 The World's Largest Cities in 1850
The period between 1800 and 1850 was a period of increasing urbanisation and industrialisation in both north western Europe and the United States. As we see in table 1, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the levels of industrialisation in the UK were more than double that of any other nation. The result of this was that UK per capita GDP was the highest in the world in 1850 and London was by then the world's largest city (Table 4) . Paris was also by now the third largest city in the world, and for the first time cities in North America, most notably New York, appear in the list of the world's largest fifteen cities, although the level of industrialisation in the US at this stage was still only equivalent to France (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007). The overall rate of growth of the largest cities, however, was increasing. Of the world's largest cities in 1850, during the fifty years between 1800 and 1850, ten out of the world's largest fifteen cities had experienced faster growth than their equivalent ranked city in 1800 had experienced during the previous hundred years between 1700 and 1800. Yet, by 1850, only six of the world's fifteen largest cities were in Asia. These changes in the scale of the major cities therefore also point to a geographical shift in the nature of urbanisation. In particular, the change in global city rankings between 1800 and 1850 reflects the fact that rapid industrialisation was taking place in the European and North American economies in comparison to the major Asia economies which remained largely rural.
Table 5 The World's Largest Cities in 1900
The era with the fastest growth of industrialisation was the second half of the nineteenth century up to the eve of WWI. During the fifty years leading up to WWI, while the levels of industrialisation in UK and France had doubled, in the USA and Germany they had increased six-fold. Between 1820 and 1913 these enormous increases in the levels of industrialisation were also associated with rapidly increasing inequality between the different parts of the world, with the rich industrialised Atlantic economies plus British off-shoots pulling away from the rest of the world (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007) . This period of enormous industrialisation also coincides with the era of the most rapid period of urbanisation. As we see in table 1, the global urbanisation rates had tripled during the nineteenth century. By comparing Table 5 with Table 4 , we see that during the fifty years between 1850 and 1900, eleven out of the world's largest fifteen cities had experienced faster total growth than their equivalent ranked city in 1850 had experienced between 1800 and 1850. The world's largest cities now reflected the economies with both the highest levels of per capita productivity and also productivity growth. As we also see in Table 5 , by 1900, twelve out of the world's fifteen largest cities were now either in western Europe or the United States. The fastest growing major city in the world was Chicago, which grew from 100,000 in 1858 to over 1.7million in 1900. Moreover, even the largest city in the rest of the world (Tokyo) was now located in Asia's highest per capita productivity economy. Apart from the Beijing which was actually contracting, the only major exception to these general patterns in the nineteenth century was that of the Indian cities of Lucknow, Mumbai, and Kolkata, each of which were transhipment points, ports, as well as military garrisons for the British East Indian Company. As such, the growth of these cities can be understood in relation to the enormous growth of the British Empire during the nineteenth century. The evidence presented so far regarding from the late Middle Ages right up to the eve of WWI all points to a clear positive link between industrialisation, trade, growth and urbanisation. Not surprisingly therefore, by 1925, as the dominant city of the world's dominant economy, New York had emerged as the world's largest city (Table 6) . Moreover, by now fourteen of the world's largest fifteen cities were located either in Europe, USA or Japan. Only Buenos Aires, which was the world's fastest-growing major city in the early part of the twentieth century, was outside of these regions, and this too was located in a rich country. In 1925, all of the world's largest cities were in the richest and largest economies.
However, the urbanisation growth rates of the largest cities as a whole had slowed down slightly during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Of the world's largest cities in 1925, during the twenty-five years between 1900 and 1925, only four out of the world's largest fifteen cities had experienced faster total growth than the equivalent ranked city in 1900 had experienced during the previous fifty years between 1850 and 1900. This slowing down of the urbanisation growth rates of the largest cities also continued through the depression and war era of the 1930s and 1940s (Table 7) . Of the world's largest cities in 1950, between 1925 and 1950 , only six out of the world's largest fifteen cities had experienced faster growth than their equivalent ranked city in 1925 had experienced between 1900 and 1925. Apart from the rapid growth of Los Angeles, in terms of the industrialised countries, the overall global city rankings therefore remained relatively stable between 1925 and 1950. This slowing down of the rate of urbanisation growth was also associated with a massive global contraction of trade and foreign investment (Crafts 2004). In the inter-war years, all major economies increasingly re-oriented their trade primarily to within the sphere of their own colonial systems (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007) . Urbanisation had always been closely associated with industrialisation, and as economic growth and trade fell, so therefore did the growth of urbanisation. The period characterised by the Depression and the Second World War can in many ways can be considered as marking the end of the first major phase of global urbanisation, which from 1750 to 1950 had been dominated by Europe and North America. This initial phase of urbanisation-industrialisation had lead to an increase in the global number of urban dwellers from fifteen million to over 400 million, and an increase in the global urbanisation index from 10% to 52% (UNFRPA 2008). The immediate post-WWII period can be regarded in many ways as marking the start of the second phase of global urbanisation (UNFPA 2008). Since 1950, not only has the urbanisation rate increase globally, but this second phase of global urbanisation has also been qualitatively quite different in many ways to the first phase. In particular, this second phase of globalisation since 1950 has been dominated by the rise of urbanisation in developing countries. During the post WWII Bretton-Woods era, the growth in urbanisation once again picked up. In 1950 there were globally sixty-seven cities with over one million inhabitants (Chandler 1987) , whereas by 1975 there were one hundred and ninety urban agglomerations with over one million inhabitants (Chandler 1987) . The US accounted for twenty-five of these millionplus agglomerations, western Europe accounted for thirty-four, and Warsaw-pact Europe accounted for fifteen such agglomerations (Chandler 1987) . The proportion of the US population living in cities increased at a higher rate in the post-war era than during the interwar period (Leven 1999). However, while most cities continued to grow during this period, there were some industrial cities which actually declined in population during this era as manufacturing exhibited an urban-rural drift. In Europe this was particularly noticeable in the traditional manufacturing heartlands of the UK (Fothergill et al. 1985) and Germany (Mackensen 1999), while in both the US (Glaeser 2005) and Europe (Sassen 2006 ) many of the very largest cities saw actual population declines in the core parts of the agglomerations as people moved out to more suburban locations. This decentralisation tended to be associated with ever-increasing commuting distances into the urban centres.
This post-war period also saw the emergence for the first time of rapid urbanisation in developing countries. By 1975 over seventy-five of the one hundred and ninety urban agglomerations with over one million inhabitants were from the so-called Third World countries (Chandler 1987) , with seven cities in developing countries, namely Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Cairo, Shanghai and Kolkata, all amongst the world's top fifteen cities (Table 8) In the developing world, the rate of urbanisation was even more dramatic. By 2005 the developing world's urban population of 2.4 billion accounted for approximately threequarters of the global urban population (World Bank 2008; UNFPA 2008) . The proportion of the population in the low and middle income countries of the developing world which lived in urban areas had increased from 37% to 44% between 1990 and 2005, while during the same period the proportion of the population in developing countries living in cities of over one million inhabitants had increased from 14% to 17% (World Bank 2008). As we see in Table 9 , by 2000, ten of the world's largest fifteen cities were from the developing world, and this tendency towards mega-cities in the developing world was not specific to one or two countries, in that these ten cities were located in eight different countries. The recent annual growth of the urban population in low and middle income countries in the developing world between 1990 and 2005 was 2.6% while that high income countries was only 1.1% (World Bank 2008) . However, all the evidence suggests that the rate of urbanisation in the developing world will increase even faster relative that that of the developed world. United Nations' predictions suggest that the global urban population will increase to 4.9 billion by 2030, of which 3.9 billion will be in the developing world (UNFPA 2008). As such, the level of urbanisation in the developing world will increase by 60% between 2000 and 2030, which is some 3.75 times greater than the urbanisation rate in the developed world over the same period. Moreover, this unprecedented urbanisation is not simply a result of population growth, in that over the same period, the global rural population is expected to actually decrease (UNFPA 2008). Between 1950 and 2030, the total urbanisation index of the developing world will increase from 18% to 56% (UNFPA 2008), with the majority of this increasing urbanisation taking place in Asia and Africa. By then, Asia and Africa will account for 80% of the global urban population (UNFPA 2008). The mega-cities of the developing world pose major challenges in terms of poverty reduction, environmental degradation, health care, and housing. These are enormous issues in their own right and we do not enter into these complex debates in this particular paper. For our purposes it is sufficient to note that the rise of urbanisation and mega-cities in the developing world has been one of the two major features of the second phase of global urbanisation.
There is also another new feature of the current phase of global urbanisation which is rather different to the first phase of global urbanisation, and this feature is related primarily to the case of cities in the industrialised world. Between 1700 and 1950 the global city rankings became increasingly dominated by the largest and most productive national economies. Indeed, by 1925 all of the world's largest fifteen cities were located in high income economies. There appeared to be a longstanding direct relationship between urban scale, national productivity and the scale of the national economy. This simple relationship appears to have broken down somewhat between 1950 and 2000, in that the majority of the world's largest cities are no longer located in the world's most productive economies.
It is still very much the case, however, that the world's most productive cities are currently located in the world's most productive economies. Fourteen of the world's fifteen highest per capita productivity cities are located in the USA, with London ranked at thirteenth being the only top-fifteen city located outside of the world's most productive economy (Table 10) . Indeed, the twenty-three largest urban areas of the USA all rank in the top twenty-seven most productive cities in the world. The next fifty-five of the world's highest productivity cities are all located in the high income countries (OECD 2007), including Taiwan, Israel, Hong Kong and Singapore. Therefore, in order to examine the role played by these high productivity cities in the modern economy we can calculate their relative productivity with respect to their own national average levels of productivity. Table 9 present these results for both US cities and also non-US cities in the OECD. As we see in Table 10 (2007) classifies as 'medium to large metro areas' of between 3 and 6.99 million inhabitants; and only 14 are mega-cities of at least 7 million inhabitants. Excluding the top twenty-three cities in the US and therefore focusing just on the rest of the world, of the world's most productive 52 non-US cities, 21 are small metro areas of less than 3 million inhabitants; 20 are what the OECD (2007) classifies as 'medium to large metro areas' of between 3 and 6.99 million inhabitants; and only 11 are mega-cities of at least 7 million inhabitants. For OECD cities of over 1.25 million inhabitants, although it is statistically significant, there is only a very weak cross-sectional link between city per capita productivity and city population, which if anything, is slightly negative (OECD 2007 ). This appears to be related to the effect of the very large cities. For cities of over six million inhabitants, there is a weak but statistically significant negative cross-sectional relationship between city per capita productivity and city population. On the other hand, for cities of less than ten million, the positive relationship between city per capita productivity and city population is both statistically significant and strong (OECD 2007). As such, amongst OECD cities there appears to be something of a ∩-shaped relationship between city per capita productivity and population scale. Observation of Table 9 suggests that if the largest cities from developing countries were also to be included in such crosssectional estimations, then clearly the effect of population scale will be very much more negative amongst mega-cities than is the case with just the OECD cities. Part of the problem here is that it is not clear which cities such be included in cross-sectional estimations. Pooled cross-sectional samples of cities from different countries will provide different overall pictures. In order to see this we can consider Table 11 .
Table 11
The Highest Productivity Cities in the OECD Table 12 The Highest Non-US Relative Productivity Cities in the OECD Table 11 lists the top fifteen per capita productivity US cities and also the top fifteen non-US OECD cities, and indicates their city per capita productivity relative to the national average productivity for the countries in which they are located. Obviously the US rankings remain unchanged, but the non-US rankings differ significantly when measured relative to their national productivity levels. In Table 12 we repeat this exercise after excluding all US cities. The first three columns of Table 12 also exclude cities located in the former transition economies, as well as in Mexico and Turkey. The second three columns include all OECD countries. If we consider the first three columns of Table 12 we see that twelve of the cites are the same as those in the second three columns of Table 11 . However, the top fifteen cities in terms of relative per capita productivity in the first three columns of Table 12 are smaller on average than the top fifteen absolute productivity non-US cities. If we now consider the second three columns of Table 12 , however, we see that the rankings change dramatically, which are now dominated by cities in the poorer nations of the OECD, some of which are very large cities indeed. Ten out of the top fifteen relative productivity cities are located in either former transition-economy countries or developing country members of the OECD. Using this type of relative ranking also suggests that the most entrepreneurial cities in the developing world are also all large cities (Acs et al. 2008 ). As such, the productivity advantages of very large cities, appear to be relatively more important for lower income than for rich countries economies.
Although the relationship between city size and productivity is nowadays not so straightforward for rich countries, there is still clearly a very important role for large cities in the industrialised world in terms of driving productivity (Rosenthal and Strange 2004 ). Yet, it may be that other characteristics of the city are also just as important as scale, and much recent research suggests that key centres of knowledge (Caniels 2000 (UN-HABITAT 2008 ). As such, the ∩-shaped relationship between city per capita productivity and population scale may have actually shifted to the left slightly, as well as changed shape, as labour out-migration from cities specialised in declining industries gives rise to the growth of other cities specialised in growing sectors. For advanced economies today, knowledge, creativity, innovation and connectivity, appear to be far more important for productivity than simply scale, with the result that across the OECD higher income cities are actually outgrowing lower income cities, irrespective of population scale (OECD 2007) .
These findings all suggest that there have been qualitative changes in the role of cities in the industrialised world which favour the competitive advantages associated with cities being centres of knowledge. As Porter (1990) points out, however, it is not regions which compete but firms located in regions. As such, the clues as to why particular cities are highly productive lie in the types of firms which are located there. For firms which invest heavily in knowledge assets, in order to generate the required returns to their knowledge investments, many of the knowledge-based firms located in such cities must capture markets which extend well beyond the borders of their own country. Traditionally, these returns were generated by exports. However, one of the key features of the current phase of globalisation is that there is now an increasing premium associated with face-to-face contact (McCann 2008) , and this implies that the global engagement facilitated by direct international investment is becoming relatively far more important than exporting as a means of global engagement. As such, the relationship between cities, countries, and globalisation is therefore increasingly dependent on the role of multinational firms as conduits and facilitators of such global engagement. This is the third issue to be discussed.
WORKING PRINCIPLE 2: In the developed world urban scale is no longer the unambiguous indicator of either national or city performance, as used to be the case, whereas in developing countries urban scale is a much better indicator of economic
performance. The optimal scale of cities in advanced economies appears to be largely similar to the optimal scale in the early twentieth century.
Multinational Firms, Economic Integration and Global Cities.
As we have seen, globalisation processes between the seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries were spearheaded by the first multinational corporations of the UK, Dutch and French East and West India companies. However, from the late eighteenth century onwards, the rise of UK firms such as Rothschild and Barings, followed by US firms such as JP Morgan in the late nineteenth century, slowly transformed capitalism from a mercantilist colonial system into a genuinely global market-based system. These developments in the financial markets were also mirrored in the manufacturing economy with the rise of British and then US multinational manufacturing firms, most of which began expanding overseas during the first few decades of the twentieth century (Jones 2005) . Multinational enterprises (MNEs) therefore played a critical role in the various earlier phases of globalisation within a broadly colonial type of system, although for much of the twentieth century, economic growth has been dominated by internal growth within individual nation-states. Even today, however, at a global scale, domestic private investment still dominates foreign direct investment by approximately a four to one ratio, and in developing or transition countries these ratios are often significantly higher than this. As such, it might be argued that it is domestic investment issues rather than international investment issues which are critical to understanding contemporary growth (World Bank 2005) . However, the situation is far more complex than this, because in the current phase of globalisation, international investment issues play an increasingly important role in a country's domestic performance. Two notable examples serve to highlight this point. Firstly, currently over half of all Chinese manufactured exports are accounted for by foreign-owned multinational firms (Scheve and Slaughter 2007), and secondly, overseas-owned multinational firms account for two-thirds of all sales of the Indian ICT sector (Scheve and Slaughter 2007). These observations suggest that the trade performance of these rapidly-emerging countries is also intrinsically related to the international investment decisions of multinational enterprises (MNEs). This is confirmed by the fact that East Asia, with China at its core, had a share of global income of 20.3% in 2005 which was less than its share of global GDP (World Bank 2007). The reason for this discrepancy is that there are huge outflows of profits from East Asia to other parts of the world due to the enormous levels of multinational foreign direct investment (FDI) in this part of the world.
These observations all point to the critical role played by multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the current phase of globalisation. The technological and institutional changes outlined above offer major advantages to multinational enterprises (MNEs) in that not only now is it easier than ever for them to invest in different countries, but it is also now cheaper than ever for them to engage in cross-border trade within their own corporate structures (McCann 2008) . MNEs are best-placed to take advantage of this increasing economic inter-connectedness because of their specific capabilities in the arena of international investment and the crossborder coordination of commercial activities. There is overwhelming evidence for this. At the end of the 1960s there were approximately only 7,000 MNEs in the global economy, and the ownership of these firms was accounted for almost entirely by just fifteen countries. In 2000 there were an estimated 63,000 MNEs in the global economy accounting for some 690,000 foreign affiliates ( As such, the number of MNEs in the global economy has increased by more than eleven-fold in four decades, with the number of MNEs in the global economy increasing at a rate of approximately 1000-2000 per annum, while the number of MNE foreign affiliates has been increasing by 10,000-20,000 per annum.
Over recent decades, the levels of output, trade and employment which are associated with multinational firms have also increased much more rapidly than the growth of global trade (McCann and Mudambi 2005) . During the 1980s and 1990s, both the gross product of international production and also the gross sales of foreign affiliates increased by much faster than either global GDP or global exports. The gross product from foreign affiliates in 1980 was approximately 5% of global GDP, whereas it is now of the order of 10% of global GDP. The value of sales from foreign affiliates was twice that of global exports in 1999 (UNCTAD 2000) , and by 2002 the ratio had increased to two and a quarter to one (UNCTAD 2003) . The 78,000 multinational firms now operating in the global economy currently account for an estimated $4.8trillion in value-added and $4.7trillion in exports (UNCTAD 2007). These figures reflect that fact that foreign direct investment has been growing at approximately twice the speed of world trade, which itself has grown at twice the rate of world income. The result is that In contrast, manufacturing's share of global FDI inflows has fallen from 41% in 1990 to approximately 30% (UNCTAD 2007) today, with the balance accounted for by share of global inward FDI into primary industries, which is currently little more than 6% (UNCTAD 2004). In terms of the modes of FDI, the number of greenfield FDI projects in total increased globally by 13% to some 11,800 projects in 2005, of which manufacturing accounted for 54% of these projects, the service sector accounting for 42%, and primary industries accounting for 4% (UNCTAD 2007 ). Yet, while greenfield investments are the popular notion of FDI, in the current phase of globalisation FDI is increasingly dominated by mergers and acquisitions (M&As). M&As now account for two-thirds of all FDI inflows (UNCTAD 2007). Mergers and acquisitions are the major mode of international market entry for all forms of service sector FDI, and by the end of the 1990s service industries accounted for over 60% of all international mergers and acquisitions (UNCTAD 2004) . Therefore, much of the explanation for the increasing dominance of M&As as the principal mode of FDI entry into foreign markets is due to the faster growth of the service industry in the global economy, relative to other sectors (World Bank 2007).
Although the current phase of globalisation has witnessed a rapid growth in the number of MNEs and MNE foreign affiliates, at the global scale, however, there is also tremendous concentration of resources and outputs in a relatively small number of MNEs. Of the global total of 78,000 MNEs, the top 500 multinationals account for over 90% of the world's stock of FDI, and nearly 50% of global trade (Rugman 2005) . Indeed, just the largest 100 MNEs alone account for 10% of the foreign assets of MNEs, 17% of their foreign sales, and 13% of the total employment in affiliates of MNEs (UNCTAD 2007) . The largest MNEs are concentrated in industries such as finance, automobiles, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, electronics, power, and petroleum, and the rankings and composition of the top 100 global firms have remained relatively stable over the last decade. In terms of the critical issue of knowledge generation discussed in the previous section, the largest MNEs make an overwhelming contribution to global knowledge generation. In 2005 the 700 largest R&D expenditure MNEs were estimated to account for 46% of all global R&D expenditures, and 69% of global private sector business R&D expenditure (UNCTAD 2005) . More than half of these 700 firms are in just the three sectors of IT hardware, automotive, and pharmaceuticals or biotechnology (UNCTAD 2007) , and over 80% of these firms come from just five countries: US, Japan, Germany, UK and France (UNCTAD 2005). As such, the largest MNEs play a critical role in the global levels of knowledge generation, innovation and knowledge transfer.
Apart from the overwhelming role of MNEs in driving globalisation, the economic geography of their investment behaviour demonstrates a very specific logic, in that their investments are dominated both by the 'super-regions' from which they emerge, and also by key 'global cities' within these super-regions.
On the first point, there is a crucial link between the patterns of investment and sales by multinationals and the trade blocs and areas of integration from which these multinationals emerge. This is because multinational firms, rather than being completely global, are actually overwhelmingly regional, in the sense that their sales, investments and R&D are dominated by the same 'super-regions' or trade blocs in which their parent companies are located (Rugman 2000 (Rugman , 2005 . For example, if we take the case of the three major global 'superregions' of US-Canada, EU and East Asia, we find that the average same-regional sales share of the world's top 500 MNEs, is over 70% (Rugman 2005) . As such, the geographical origins of global R&D reflect almost exactly the geographical origins of FDI outflows. Moreover, these trends of 'global-regionalising' (Rugman 2000 'global-regionalising' (Rugman , 2005 , rather than simply 'globalising' investment patterns, are being further promoted by cross-border institutional changes within super-regions. The number of preferential trade agreements between countries doubled between (UNCTAD 2007 , while the number of international investment agreements (IIAs) between countries, which includes both bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and double taxation treaties (DDTs), increased from 900 in 1980 to just over 3800 in 1999 (UNCTAD 2000) , and had reached almost 5,500 by 2006 (UNCTAD 2007) . The most noticeable aspect of the impact of these bilateral agreements, however, is that geographical proximity is becoming increasingly important for trade and FDI (UNCTAD 2000 (UNCTAD , 2007 . The geographical patterns of principally, double taxation treaties (DTTs), and secondarily, bilateral investment treaties (BITs), closely resembles the cross-border patterns of FDI (UNCTAD 2003) . The most striking case of this is that of the EU. In terms of bilateral inward investment stocks, in 1995, 17 of the top 50 pairs of countries were from Europe, whereas by 2005, this number had increased to 22 (UNCTAD 2007) . In terms of the global economy, the major outcome of these institutional changes which have promoted the advantages of geographical proximity, has been the increasing relative importance of the super-regions within the global economic system. These observations therefore suggest that multinational firms play a crucial role in facilitating knowledge flows between countries, and this is particularly important for countries within the same global super-regions. Moreover, following our previous discussions, the location behaviour of such firms would therefore also appear to be critical in explaining why particular cities are knowledge centres. There is much additional evidence that this is indeed the case and this evidence comes from the literature on 'global cities' (Sassen 1994; 2002; Taylor 2004) , which examines the role played by particular cities and city-regions as the principal location bases for globally connected firms. The analysis of global cities suggests that in the current phase of globalisation, the links between a city and other parts of the global economy are a key determinant of the city's performance. The importance and influence of a city in the global system is measured in terms of the extent of its global 'connectivity' (Taylor 2004) , and connectivity is defined in various ways, relating to trade linkages, transport linkages, financial linkages, corporate decision-making linkages, headquarter functions, asset management roles, and human capital mobility impacts (Taylor 2004; (Sassen 2006) . By applying weighting measures and algorithms to data on these various linkage characteristics, it is possible to rank cities according to their global connectedness.
Table 13 Global City Rankings
The global city rankings and also the rankings of global financial centres, both of which are calculated on the basis of commercial connectivity, are very closely related to the global rankings of the world's highest productivity cities. Almost all of the top fifty global cities and also the top fifty global financial centres are amongst the fifty highest productivity cities in the world. The striking correspondence between the global city, global financial centre, and world city-productivity rankings, support the contention that the performance of these cities is largely related to the companies located there, and in particular, the globally competitive multinational firms located there.
WORKING PRINCIPLE 3: The performance of global cities depends on the performance of the multinational firms located in these cities, and the relationship between cities, nations and multinational investment is increasingly associated with proximity and cross-border investment linkages within the same super-regions.
The Past, Present and Future Relationship between Cities and States
On the basis of our historical analysis and our three working principles it is possible to reconsider the question as to whether it is cities or nations which are more important.
In the late Middle Ages, prosperous cities and states were often synonymous entities. However, ever since then, the growth of urbanisation has been intrinsically associated with both increasing industrialisation and also the growth of the national market. As such, over time, city-states and micro-states gradually gave way to the emerging nation states, which spurred the early stages of globalisation via their colonial ventures. The modern notion of a nation state is largely a nineteenth and twentieth century product of these historical processes.
The major first phase of urbanisation lasted from around 1750 right up to the eve of WWII. During this first phase, global urbanisation processes were dominated by the industrialisation processes of the high income economies and by the early twentieth century, the world's leading economies contained all of the world's largest cities. As such, during this period there emerged a fairly direct relationship between urban scale and the performance of the economy, and this relationship emerged at the same time as the modern notion of a nation state was also emerging. City agglomeration economies were the internal engine driving each of the individual national economies, whose raw material requirements were provided for by their respective colonial arenas.
In the post WWII era, however, in terms of population scale, urbanisation has increasingly become dominated by the developing world, and this dominance has become particularly marked in the last three decades. Urban productivity, on the other hand, is now relatively much less dominated by urban scale than in previous eras. Although cities have grown in absolute scale all over the world, most of the world's most productive cities are nowadays classed as either medium or large size cities, rather than as mega-cities. Moreover, the fact that this is so both in the US as well as in other OECD countries also suggests that this outcome is not necessarily related to the size of the country.
The optimum size for many cities seems nowadays to be largely equivalent to the scale of the world's largest cities in the early part of the twentieth century. Therefore, over the last sixty or seventy years there appears to have been something a change in the previously fairly direct relationship between city size, city productivity and the performance of the national economy. The reason is that the performance of a city nowadays depends primarily on the global engagement of the firms located within the city, and the performance of a nation nowadays appears to be largely related to the performance of the city-regions located within it. Moreover, there is an increasing correspondence between the scale of mutual trade flows, mutual investment flows and geographical proximity between countries, as groups of countries located in the same parts of the world develop stronger interrelations. As such, the modern phase of globalisation is primarily associated with global regionalism.
Early developments of the nation state were primarily driven by military power (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007) , in which mutual trade between adjacent nations was relatively very limited, as countries sought to develop their own independent empires. Firm and city growth was therefore a matter which was largely internal to the individual nation-empire-state. Today, the situation is reversed. National performance depends primarily on a nation's city-regions, whose performance in turn depends on the global engagement of the firms located there. The geographical investment behaviour of these firms means that increasing economic integration between adjacent countries will continue in the long run. On this argument, the individual nation-state is in many ways therefore becoming weaker than ever as an arbiter of its own destiny, and this weakness becomes magnified the smaller is the nation and the less globally connected are its cities. The recent financial crisis demonstrates these issues, whereby the fortunes of the global economy depended entirely on the coordinated decisions made by the groupings of large countries containing most of the major global cities. 
